




THE CASE FOR A SUSTAINABLE CLIMATE POLICY:  WHY COSTS 
AND BENEFITS MUST BE TEMPORALLY BALANCED 
ROGER A. PIELKE, JR.†
How much longer do you think it will take before [the nation’s climate 
researchers] are able to hone [their] conclusions down to some very 
simple recommendations, on tangible, specific action programs that are 
rational and sensible and cost effective for us to take . . . [and] justified 
by what we already know?
1
Clearly, it’s time for some radical ideas about solving global warming.  
But where’s radical realism when we need it?
2
The question of what actions on climate change make sense in the 
short term—raised in the quotes above—remains largely unanswered.  
Until we better organize the climate science and technology enter-
prise to focus on policy options for the short term, the climate debate 
is likely to remain in its present gridlock.  Policies that address climate 
change—including both mitigation and adaptation—have both long-
term and short-term effects.  To date, climate policy has focused pri-
marily on the long term, and so too has the research intended to in-
form that policy.  As a consequence, too little attention is paid to pol-
icy options and technological alternatives that might make sense in 
the short term.  One reason for the short term being overlooked is the 
intellectual gerrymandering of the climate change issue at the inter-
national level, which has maintained a narrow focus on greenhouses 
gases (GHGs) and their effects.  Billions of dollars of public invest-
ments in climate science and technology might be reoriented to bet-
ter serve the needs of decision makers grappling with climate change, 
which will be a policy issue for decades to come, by focusing on poli-
cies that make sense in both the short and long terms. 
This Article presents a series of seven assertions.  First, human-
caused climate change is real and requires attention by policy makers 
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to both mitigation and adaptation—but there is no quick fix.  The is-
sue will be with us for decades and longer.  Second, any conceivable 
emissions reductions policies, even if successful, cannot have a per-
ceptible impact on the climate for many decades.  Third, costs (what-
ever they may be) are consequently borne in the near term, while cli-
mate-related benefits are achieved in the distant future.  Fourth, many 
policies that result in a reduction in emissions also provide benefits in 
the short term which are unrelated to climate change.  Fifth, adapta-
tion policies can similarly provide immediate benefits.  Sixth, climate 
policy, particularly international climate policy under the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),3 has 
been structured so as to keep policy related to long-term climate 
change distinct from policies related to shorter-term issues of energy 
policy and adaptation.  Seventh, research agendas have followed the 
political organization of international climate change policy and have 
emphasized the long term, meaning that relatively little attention is 
paid to developing specific policy options or near-term technologies 
that might be put into place with both short-term and long-term bene-
fits.  The climate debate may have slowly begun to reflect these reali-
ties, but the research and development community has not yet fo-
cused much attention on research to develop policy and technological 
options that might be politically viable, cost effective, and practically 
feasible. 
I.  NO QUICK FIX FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
This Article begins by underscoring the scientific consensus pre-
sented in assessment of climate change science provided by Working 
Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).4  
The IPCC has concluded that GHG emissions resulting from human 
activity are an important driver of changes in climate.  On this basis 
alone, it makes sense to take action to limit GHG emissions.  Of 
course, the answer to the question of what action should be taken is 
not at all straightforward, and involves a number of considerations 
(e.g., on what time scale, at what costs, with what consequences, with 
what foregone opportunities, etc.).  One of the important messages of 
the IPCC is that there is no quick fix to issues of climate change.  In its 
 3 See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
[UNFCCC], http://unfccc.int/2860.php (last visited May 1, 2007). 
4 See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], http:// 
www.ipcc.ch (last visited May 1, 2007). 
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third assessment report, the IPCC concluded that “[a]nthropogenic 
climate change will persist for many centuries.”5  More recent re-
search has concluded that, even assuming a hypothetical instantane-
ous curtailment of emissions, the world will continue to experience 
some degree of climate change into the future. 
Throughout this Article, I use the phrase “climate change” to 
mean: 
a statistically significant variation in either the mean state of the climate 
or in its variability, persisting for an extended period (typically decades 
or longer).  Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or 
external forcings, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the compo-
sition of the atmosphere or in land use.
6
I will further use “climate variability” to mean: 
variations in the mean state and other statistics (such as standard devia-
tions, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) of the climate on all temporal 
and spatial scales beyond that of individual weather events.  Variability 
may be due to natural internal processes within the climate system (in-
ternal variability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic external 
forcing (external variability).
7
Under the IPCC definitions, both climate change and climate 
variability have human and non-human elements, and the human 
element goes beyond GHGs to include other sources of human influ-
ences on the climate system.  Clearly explicating these definitions is 
important because the FCCC uses a different and much narrower 
definition of climate change that is focused only on the marginal ef-
fects of GHG emissions on the climate system.8  The different defini-
tions profoundly affect climate policy and its relationship to research 
and policy, which I will discuss in Part VI. 
II.  SUCCESSFUL POLICIES WILL HAVE A DELAYED IMPACT 
At a 2005 Senate hearing on climate change science and econom-
ics, James Hurrell of the United States National Center for Atmos-
pheric Research made a very important observation about the time 
scale of the benefits of mitigation policies for altering climate behav-
ior:  “it should be recognized that mitigation actions taken now mainly 
5 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001:  THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 17 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001). 
6 Id. at 787. 
7 Id. at 789. 
8 See infra Part VI. 
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have benefits 50 years and beyond now.”9  Science magazine further 
reported in 2005 that “the wheels of global climate change are in mo-
tion, and there is little we can do to stop them, at least in the short-
term.”10  That the long lead time until mitigation can have a percepti-
ble effect on climate systems seems to be well appreciated by many 
scientists and policy analysts, but seems to be less well appreciated in 
public and political debates over climate policy. 
Scientists sometimes tend to skirt around this important point by 
talking about “scenarios” for future emissions rather than actual poli-
cies that lead to particular scenarios.  Such scenarios have an impor-
tant role in shaping thinking and research on the range of possible 
futures.  At the same time, it is quite easy to postulate various alterna-
tive scenarios for future emissions that lead to discernible changes in 
global temperature.  It is, of course, similarly easy to discuss various 
“rosy” scenarios for global poverty, democracy in Iraq, or the future 
state of the deficit.  What matters for real-world outcomes are not sce-
narios of the future, but the concrete, practical policy actions that 
lead to outcomes that are distinguishable from outcomes that result 
from the implementation of alternative policy actions. 
From this perspective, despite all of the bluster about the Kyoto 
Protocol, its implementation is more about symbolism and prepara-
tion for future policy action than about any significant effect on the 
climate system.  In 2006, economist William Nordhaus of Yale Univer-
sity wrote that 
[t]he Kyoto Protocol is widely seen as somewhere between troubled and 
terminal. . . . Even if the current Protocol is extended, models indicate 
that it will have little impact on global temperature change.  Unless 
there is a dramatic breakthrough or a new design, the Protocol threatens 
to be seen as a monument to institutional overreach.
11
According to Oxford’s Steve Rayner, the focus on Kyoto has dis-
tracted attention from other possible approaches: 
9 Climate Change:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Res.,  109th 
Cong. 42 (2005) (statement of James W. Hurrell, Director, Climate and Global Dynam-
ics Div., Nat’l Ctr. for Atmospheric Research). 
10 Kathy Wren, No Turning Back From Climate Change, Mar. 18, 2005, 
http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2005/0318scipak.shtml.  See Gerard A. Meehl et 
al., How Much More Global Warming and Sea Level Rise?, 307 SCIENCE 1766 (2005); T.M.L. 
Wigley, The Climate Change Commitment, 307 SCIENCE 1766 (2005). 
11 William D. Nordhaus, After Kyoto:  Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global 
Warming 1 (Int’l Relations Ctr., Foreign Policy in Focus Discussion Paper, 2006), 
available at http://www.fpif.org/pdf/papers/0603afterkyoto.pdf. 
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Unfortunately, support for Kyoto has become a litmus test for determin-
ing those who take the threat of climate change seriously.  Between 
Kyoto’s supporters and those who scoff at the dangers of leaving green-
house gas emissions unchecked, there has been a tiny minority of com-
mentators and analysts convinced of the urgency of the problem while 
remaining profoundly sceptical of the proposed solution. But their 
voices have largely gone unheard.
12
Nordhaus would seem to agree on this point:  “Nations are now 
beginning to consider the structure of climate-change policies for the 
period after 2008-2012.  Some countries, states, cities, companies, and 
even universities are adopting their own climate-change policies.”13  
Nordhaus then asks:  “Are there in fact alternatives to the scheme of 
tradable emissions permit [sic] embodied in the Protocol?  The fact is 
that alterative approaches have not had a serious hearing among 
natural scientists or among policymakers.”14
Experience with the actual practice of emissions reductions indi-
cates that even those countries expressing strong support for reduc-
tions face difficulties achieving them in practice.  Tim Dyson from the 
London School of Economics has offered a sobering view of such cli-
mate realism: 
[I]n the last decade or so virtually all countries have continued to burn 
greater amounts of fossil fuel.  This also applies to those that have ar-
guably been most prominent in supporting the Kyoto process—notably 
Canada, Japan and those of the [EU]. Many of these countries are 
unlikely to meet their CO2 reduction targets agreed under the Kyoto 
treaty (which finally came into force in 2005).  Thus comparing 1990 
and 2002, it is estimated that Canada’s emissions increased by 22% and 
Japan’s by 13.  While the CO2 emissions of the 15 countries that com-
prised the EU before 2004 (i.e. the EU15) remained roughly constant, 
this was mainly due to reductions in Germany and Britain—both of 
which gained fortuitously from a move away from coal towards natural 
gas (which emits less CO2 per unit of energy).  Of the remaining coun-
tries in the EU(15), only Sweden—which relies heavily on hydro and nu-
clear—registered a fall in CO2 emissions . . . .  Of the 36 “Annex B” coun-
tries of the Kyoto treaty (i.e. the industrialized countries, including 
former eastern bloc nations), only 12 experienced declines in emissions:  
the three in the EU(15), plus nine former eastern bloc nations.  If one 
excludes these, then CO2 emissions among the remaining 24 Annex B 
countries rose by 13% during 1990-2002.  Of course, the United States, 
12 Memorandum from Steve Rayner, Dir., James Martin Inst., Univ. of Oxford, to 
the Envtl. Audit Comm. of the House of Commons (Nov. 24, 2007), available at  
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/EAC%20memo%20fin.doc. 
13 Nordhaus, supra note 11, at 1. 
14 Id. 
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the world’s largest emitter of CO2, is not a signatory to the Kyoto treaty.  
And, to complete the list of [predictable social reactions], the “Kyoto 
process” . . . [has] involved no shortage of recrimination between repre-
sentatives of the US, the EU, and other countries.
15
The bottom line is that, with respect to modulating the behavior 
of the climate system, current GHG mitigation policies (whether pro-
posed or implemented) are more symbolic than substantive.  A focus 
on such policies has been recognized by a number of observers as lim-
iting the scope of discussions about alternative policies that might re-
sult in greater substantive outcomes.  The limited discussion of alter-
natives has been restricted by advocates for action with assertions that, 
despite their flaws, current approaches are merely first steps and that 
a discussion of options might diminish political momentum for ac-
tion.  Of course, opponents to action do not wish to discuss policy op-
tions in the first place.  As discussed in Part VI, action on adaptation 
has been a victim of the institutionalization of climate policy, which 
demonstrates a strong bias in favor of mitigation over adaptation.  But 
even with a pace of emissions reductions that seems practically, if not 
politically, inconceivable today, such reductions would have little or 
no perceptible effect on the climate system for decades. 
As a result, more than ever, discussions of new and creative policy 
options on climate change that make sense in the short term are 
needed in political debate over climate change. 
III.  NEAR-TERM COSTS AND DISTANT-FUTURE BENEFITS 
The reality of the time lag between costs and benefits illustrates 
the disingenuousness of using current climate events to justify mitiga-
tion action.  Even if society takes immediate and drastic action on 
emissions, there can be no scientifically valid argument that such ac-
tions will lead to a perceptibly better climate in our lifetime.  For the 
coming decades, the most effective policy responses to climate-related 
impacts (such as hurricanes and other disasters or diseases like ma-
laria) will necessarily be adaptive. 
15 Tim Dyson, On Development, Demography and Climate Change:  The End of the World 
as We Know It?, 27 POPULATION & ENV’T 117, 132-33 (2005) (citations omitted); cf. 
Pekka E. Kauppi, The United Nations Climate Convention:  Unattainable or Irrelevant, 270 
SCIENCE 1454, 1454 (1995) (stating presciently that the goal of the UNFCCC  to “pre-
vent dangerous . . . interference with the climate system” was either “unattainable or 
irrelevant” and that if climate model “projections are right, the climate will change, 
there will be dangerous effects, and the Convention objective will be unattainable”). 
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The point of this analysis is not to suggest that we throw up our 
hands and do nothing to mitigate the effects of climate change.  But 
the asymmetry in costs and benefits suggests that if meaningful action 
is to occur in mitigation, we must think about different strategies and, 
in particular, policy options that have greater symmetry between the 
timing of costs and benefits. 
I fully intend that this perspective be viewed as an alternative to 
the two-sided debate that has been caricatured as climate skeptics 
against climate alarmists.  Perhaps those holding this third position 
might be characterized as climate realists. 
IV.  EMISSIONS-REDUCING POLICIES ALSO PROVIDE SHORT-TERM 
BENEFITS UNRELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
Observers of climate policy have long recognized that mitigation 
actions can provide benefits that extend beyond their effects on the 
long-term behavior of the climate system.  In 2001, the IPCC Working 
Group III on Mitigation argued: 
The effectiveness of climate change mitigation can be enhanced when 
climate policies are integrated with the non-climate objectives of na-
tional and sectorial policy development and be turned into broad transi-
tion strategies to achieve the long-term social and technological changes 
required by both sustainable development and climate change mitiga-
tion.  Just as climate policies can yield ancillary benefits that improve 
wellbeing, non-climate policies may produce climate benefits.  It may be 
possible to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions by pursuing 
climate objectives through general socio-economic policies.
16
Empirical research on communities in the United States that are 
taking action to mitigate GHG emissions supports this conclusion.  
Consider the following extended excerpt from a study of local initia-
tives on climate change: 
The experience of CCP [Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign 
sponsored by the International Council for Local Environmental Initia-
tives] communities indicates that global climate change is most likely to 
be reframed as a local issue when city officials recognise that actions to 
control GHG emissions also address other local concerns already on 
their agendas.  Localisation requires the prior existence of a local hook 
on which to hang the issue of global climate change. 
 Localising global climate change is an important first step in develop-
16 IPCC, WORKING GROUP III, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:  MITIGATION 12 (Bert Metz 
et al. eds., 2001) (emphasis omitted). 
  
1850 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1843 
 
ing a municipal response to global warming; it helps generate political 
support for reducing local GHG emissions.  However, not all communi-
ties are able to move from reframing to policy action.  There are several 
institutional barriers that make it difficult for cities to develop and im-
plement policies and programmes for mitigating climate change:  the is-
sue does not fit the way most city governments organise themselves; 
many city governments lack the administrative capacity to monitor their 
GHG emissions; and there are often budgetary constraints that make it 
difficult to invest in emissions reduction activities. 
 Ultimately, motivating local action to mitigate global climate change 
calls for an indirect strategy, focused on the ways in which emissions-
producing activities are embedded in broader community concerns.  
The primary benefit of an indirect approach is that it avoids many of the 
political debates about climate change science that have plagued inter-
national efforts to address this issue.  Several officials noted that it really 
does not matter whether global climate change science is credible.  
Since the emphasis is on how reducing GHG emissions can help the city 
address other (more pressing) problems, questions of the scientific basis 
for climate change rarely come up.  When and if they do, city officials 
can easily reply that these are actions they should take anyway.
17
When it comes to effective substantive action on mitigation, re-
search and experience show quite clearly that progress is far more 
likely when such actions align a short-term aim with long-term con-
cerns.  In practice, this typically means focusing action on the short 
term, with the long-term goals taking on secondary importance.  Ex-
amples of such short-term issues related to mitigation include the 
costs of energy, the benefits of reducing reliance on fossil fuels from 
the Middle East, the innovation and job-creating possibilities of alter-
native energy technologies, particulate air pollution, transportation 
efficiencies, and so on.  This approach to climate change is contrary to 
the dominant approach, in which costs and benefits are temporally 
mismatched.18
V.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ADAPTIVE POLICIES 
In the coming decades, the only policies that can effectively be 
used to manage the immediate effects of climate variability and 
change will be adaptive.  This conclusion inescapably results from the 
fact that any realistic GHG mitigation policies will have no perceptible 
17 Michele M. Betsill, Mitigating Climate Change in US Cities:  Opportunities and Obsta-
cles, 6 LOCAL ENV’T 393, 404 (2001) (citations omitted), available at http:// 
www.colostate.edu/Depts/PoliSci/fac/mb/Local%20Environment.pdf. 
18 See infra Part VI. 
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impact on climate behavior for decades and longer.19  This conclusion 
is illustrated in the following Figure, which comes from research on 
the relative contributions of societal changes (e.g., population growth 
and development) and resultant climate changes on future tropical 
cyclone damage around the world.20
The Figure below illustrates how one dollar in global tropical cy-
clone damage today will increase by 2050 under one set of assump-
tions about changing hurricane intensity, societal development, and 




Segment F indicates that for each $1.00 of impact today (segment 
A) there will be an increase in damages of $0.64 due to the increased 
19 See supra Part II. 
20 Note that the more general term for a hurricane is a “tropical cyclone.”  See At-
lantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, FAQ:  Hurricanes, Typhoons, 
and Tropical Cyclones, http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/A1.html (last visited 
May 1, 2007). 
21 The Figure assumes that by 2050 all hurricanes will increase in intensity by 18%, 
that population and wealth will increase by a combined 2.5% per year, and that hurri-
cane damage increases are proportional to the cube of the increase in wind speed.  
The full analysis can be found in Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Future Economic Damage from 
Tropical Cyclones:  Sensitivities to Societal and Climate Changes, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL 
SOC’Y A. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/ 
publication_files/resource-2517-2007.14.pdf. 
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intensity (segment B), $1.80 due to more exposed people and wealth 
in coastal locations (segment C), and $1.16 due to the effects of the 
increased intensity on the additional people and exposed property 
(segment D) in the year 2050.  Adding these increments together 
($1.00 + $0.64 + $1.80 + $1.16) results in total damages in 2050 of 
$4.60 for every $1.00 today. 
Several additional assumptions are required to evaluate the rela-
tive potential for mitigation and adaptation to reduce this damage.  If 
we assume that GHG reductions have an instantaneous (i.e., contem-
porary with the reductions) and a proportional (e.g., a 50% decrease 
in emissions results in a 50% decrease in the increase in intensity) ef-
fect on tropical cyclone intensity,22 then under these assumptions, the 
maximum potential effectiveness of a 10% reduction in GHG emissions 
through 2050 for reducing future global tropical cyclone damage is 
$0.18 (that is, 10% of $1.80) and the maximum potential effectiveness 
of adaptation is about twenty-six times greater, or $4.60.23  These con-
clusions are qualitatively insensitive to the magnitude of the projected 
increase in tropical cyclone intensity or population scenarios. 
To emphasize:  this is not an argument against mitigation.  In-
stead, this simple analysis under the most favorable assumptions for 
mitigation indicates that any realistically achievable mitigation policies 
can have at best only an imperceptible effect on global tropical cy-
clone damage in the short term (decades into the future).  The same 
conclusion holds for other extreme events, and, I would hypothesize, 
for the vast majority of society-climate interactions.  In fact, I am not 
aware of a single study that suggests that there will be significant short-
term benefits of climate mitigation for climate impacts. 
This reality explains why adaptation necessarily must be at the 
center of climate policy.  It also helps to explain why mitigation poli-
cies in the short term necessarily must be justified by their nonclimate 
benefits. 
22 Of course, the real climate system does not work this way and the effects of 
mitigation on tropical cyclone behavior remains poorly understood, but the effects are 
certainly less direct than in the oversimplification offered here. 
23 The maximum potential effectiveness of adaptation is equal to the total costs.  If 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases could instantly be held constant such 
that there would be no effect of human-caused climate change on hurricanes, then the 
maximum effectiveness of mitigation in this case would be $1.80.  In reality, this num-
ber is substantially smaller, given the general global commitment to climate change 
and the time lag of emissions-reduction effects on the climate system.  Of course, the 
desirability of particular courses of action will also depend upon a comparison of costs 
and benefits. 
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VI.  ARBITRARY DISTINCTIONS IN CLIMATE POLICY 
The climate issue suffers from a bizarre sort of intellectual gerry-
mandering that has little basis in science or policy.  The UNFCC, 
which focuses on international policy, and the IPCC, which focuses on 
scientific assessments, use different definitions of climate change.  
Understanding the effects of the two definitions on the politics of the 
climate issue helps one to understand better the current international 
stalemate on climate policy—a stalemate that matters because climate 
change is real and actions are needed to improve energy policies and 
to reduce the vulnerability of people and ecosystems to climate effects. 
Part I of this Article explained that Working Group I of the IPCC 
has a very broad definition of climate change that includes changes 
occurring for any reason.24  By contrast, the FCCC focuses narrowly on 
GHG emissions and their consequences.  Taken literally, the focus of 
the FCCC would necessarily limit attention to the long-term conse-
quences of climate change and the extent to which GHG emissions 
drive those consequences.  This focus creates a bias against adapta-
tion, because it creates a cost-benefit calculus in which adaptation has 
only costs and no benefits.25  The FCCC definition also encourages the 
waging of political battles through science, as evidence for the detec-
tion and attribution of climate change (and whether it will exceed a 
threshold of “dangerous interference” in the climate system under 
FCCC Article 2) is necessary as a prerequisite for action under the 
FCCC. 
Numerous participants and analysts have sought to overcome this 
fundamental flaw in the structure of the FCCC by emphasizing the re-
lationships between climate policy and sustainable development.26  
Some involved in the IPCC have also recognized the importance of 
integrating issues of climate change and sustainable development, and 
a chapter on the subject is to be included in the next assessment re-
24 By contrast, Working Groups II and III often utilize the FCCC definition of cli-
mate change.  For further discussion, see Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Misdefining “Climate 
Change”:  Consequences for Science and Action, 8 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 548, 555-56 (2005). 
25 The logic behind costs without benefits is that without the marginal influence of 
GHG-induced effects on the climate system, such adaptation would be, by definition, 
unnecessary.   
26 See, e.g., Richard J.T. Klein et al., Integrating Mitigation and Adaptation into Climate 
and Development Policy:  Three Research Questions, 8 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 579, 588 (2005). 
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port in 2007.27  Nonetheless, I remain skeptical that such efforts will 
do much to alter the generally narrow intellectual approach to the 
FCCC, which is reflected throughout the IPCC.28
The narrow focus of the FCCC helps to explain why we see so 
many supposedly scientific debates related to the detection of climate 
changes and attribution of those changes to anthropogenic GHGs, 
such as the ongoing battle over the infamous “hockey stick” graph.29  
Given the emphasis placed upon detection and attribution, it is not 
too much of an exaggeration to observe that many proponents of ac-
tion on emissions reductions want to characterize every climate event 
or trend as the result of human-caused climate change, whereas op-
ponents of action on emissions reductions want to cast as much doubt 
as possible on such claims.  We have seen a perfect example of this 
dynamic in public debates over hurricanes and climate change over 
the past few years as the science of hurricanes became almost instan-
taneously caught up in the politics of the global warming debate. 
The effect of the intense politicization of climate change has been 
to preclude most reasoned discussion of innovative or new policy op-
tions on climate change.  Most of the focus instead is on empty exhor-
tations of support for “action” or claims of “too much uncertainty.”  
Such expressions may be emotionally satisfying, but do little to move 
the political debate forward in any meaningful way.  With strong pub-
lic support for action on climate change, the lack of meaningful alter-
natives continuously set forth in public debate sets the stage for what 
Tim Dyson has called a recipe for only marginal action: 
[T]he prospects for an enforceable international agreement that will 
bring about a sustained and significant reduction in annual global CO2 
emissions are very poor.  While it may be in the interest of the world as a 
whole to restrict the burning of fossil fuels, it is in the interest of individ-
ual countries to avoid making such changes . . . . Moreover, the enor-
mous complexities involved . . . will also hinder agreement.  Doubtless 
there will be gains in energy use efficiency, shifts towards less carbon in-
27 REPORT OF THE JOINT IPCC WORKING GROUP II & III EXPERT MEETING ON THE 
INTEGRATION OF ADAPTATION, MITIGATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INTO THE 
4TH IPCC ASSESSMENT REPORT (2005), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/am-sd.pdf. 
28 As a practical matter, discourse on climate policy reinforces the intellectual ger-
rymandering through new concepts, such as “mainstreaming,” which preserve rather 
than move beyond the status quo.  See Roger A. Pielke, Jr. et al., Climate Change 2007:  
Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation, 445 NATURE 597 (2007). 
29
 For differing opinions on this issue, see Real Climate, http:// 
www.realclimate.org (last visited May 1, 2007), and Climate Audit, http:// 
climateaudit.org (last visited May 1, 2007). 
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tensive fuels, and greater use of renewable energy sources (e.g. solar, 
biomass, wind and tidal power).  But except for a massive shift towards 
nuclear . . . there are limits to what such changes could possibly achieve 
in terms of CO2 reduction.  Other technological ideas—like the extrac-
tion of CO2 from coal and its sequestration underground . . . or, still 
more, the development of the so-called “hydrogen economy”—are re-
mote, ideas as large scale and significant solutions to the problem . . . . 
Indeed, such notions can themselves be regarded as providing some ba-
sis of avoidance inasmuch as they suggest that something is being done.  
Understandably, poor countries are unlikely to put great effort into con-
straining their CO2 emissions—especially in the face of massive discrep-
ancies between themselves and the rich. 
 In sum, . . . for the foreseeable future the basic response to global 
warming will be one of avoidance and, at most, marginal change.
30
A 2006 National Journal poll on the perspectives of members of 
Congress on climate science and policy supports focusing on short-
term policy issues to reduce GHG emissions.31  The poll asked, “Do 
you think it’s been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Earth 
is warming because of man-made pollution?”  Interestingly, 98% of 
Democrats replied “Yes,” while only 23% of Republicans replied 
“Yes.”32  But it should not be overlooked that, even with the party divi-
sions, a clear majority of members of the Republican-led 109th Con-
gress believed that global warming is real and is caused by humans.  If 
the poll numbers accurately reflected Congressional perspectives in 
the 109th Congress, then 55 members of the Senate and 251 members 
of the House believed that “it’s been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Earth is warming because of man-made pollution.”33  
With the political change in the leadership of the 110th Congress, 
there seems to be evidence that there is exceedingly little value left in 
continuing to argue the science of this particular question.  Clearly, 
there are other factors at play here beyond “skepticism” that shape 
how decision makers act on climate change.  Efforts to educate Con-
30 Dyson, supra note 15, at 133-34. 
31 Inside Washington:  Congressional Insiders Poll, NAT’L J., Apr. 1, 2006, at 5-6. 
32 Id. at 5.  Interestingly, as has been found in many areas, the views of members of 
Congress are more ideologically determined by their party membership than those of 
the general population.  In opinion polls of the public asking a similar question, nei-
ther Democrats nor Republicans show such unanimity of opinion.  Gallup Org., Ameri-
cans Still Not Highly Concerned About Global Warming, GALLUP POLL, Apr. 7, 2006, avail-
able at http://poll.gallup.com/content/?ci=22291.  This may be a consequence of the 
effects of the gerrymandering of Congressional districts, which has often been criti-
cized as generating a legislature that is more ideological than its constituents. 
33 Inside Washington, supra note 31, at 5. 
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gress on the reality of climate change are, in my view, completely 
wasted on a majority of the convinced. 
The 2006 National Journal poll asks a second question:  “Which of 
these actions to reduce pollution could you possibly support?”  The 
answers included five options—mandatory limits on carbon dioxide 
emissions, increased spending on alternative fuels, greater reliance on 
nuclear energy, higher fuel-efficiency standards for automobiles, and 
a higher gasoline tax.34  For each of these issues, except a gasoline tax 
(which is not favored by members of either party), there is far more 
agreement in support of action than there is on the question of sci-
ence.35  And, in each case, there is evidence of enough support to sug-
gest that bipartisan agreement might be reached on particular policy 
options.  The devil is, of course, in the details, but this poll shows that 
debate on climate policy might advance more quickly if framed in 
terms of policy options, and not science.  There is ample evidence that 
there is room for compromise across partisan boundaries, without 
turning Republicans into Democrats or vice versa. 
The nation awaits politically creative policy options that can navi-
gate the complicated set of interests of 535 members of Congress.  All 
of the precursors for such action are in place, except for the politically 
creative options.  Efforts to debate the science are simply misplaced in 
such a context.  Die-hard partisans will no doubt come up with a 
range of excuses as to why they cannot compromise, and will gravitate 
back to the science as a comfortable home for maintaining the pre-
sent debate.  Such partisans typically point the finger of blame at their 
political opponents, though they should be looking in the mirror.   
VII.  OVEREMPHASIS BY THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY ON THE LONG TERM 
AND THE NEED TO FOCUS ON PRACTICAL POLICIES 
In 1994, I argued that the U.S. Global Change Research Program 
(USGCRP) was “likely [to] produce ‘good science,’” but would be 
unlikely to deliver “usable information” to policy makers, as had been 
called for in the legislation that created the program.36  I wrote that 
instead of having a long-term focus on large-scale climate change, the 
USGCRP could “distill[] the practical significance of scientific infor-
mation, and at the same time develop a wide range of action alterna-
34 Id. at 6. 
35 Id. 
36 Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Scientific Information and Global Change Policymaking, 28 CLI-
MATIC CHANGE 315, 315 (1994). 
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tives to address the range of problems.”37  The USGCRP and its suc-
cessor, the Climate Change Science Program, have never placed the 
needs of decision makers at the center of their mission, focusing in-
stead on advancing scientific understanding.  Part of the explanation 
for this situation lies in the fact that the scientific community has 
benefited immensely from the current approach, and an emphasis on 
short-term policy and technological options would necessarily imply a 
different approach to climate science and technology policy priori-
ties.38
I am convinced that as people begin to see the limited perform-
ance of existing approaches to emissions reductions, and as the toll of 
climate-related disasters grows due to ever-increasing vulnerabilities, 
there will be a shift to a more short-term-focused approach to climate 
mitigation and adaptation.  However, given the institutional and po-
litical momentum that currently characterizes the climate issue, there 
is a substantial risk that the issue will continue to be dominated by 
sound and fury with most action being symbolic or simply ineffectual.  
The question is whether we can organize our intellectual infrastruc-
ture to invent and bring forward policy and technological options that 
will satisfy both the short-term and long-term facets of this incredibly 
complex issue.  Through oversight of the Climate Change Science 
Program and Climate Change Technology Program, Congress might 
motivate the evolution of these programs to focus more explicitly on 
the needs of decision makers.  Until this is done, we should expect 
climate policy to simply muddle along. 
 
37 Id. at 317.  For an early evaluation of USGCRP, see Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Usable 
Information for Policy:  An Appraisal of the U.S. Global Change Research Program, 28 POL’Y 
SCI. 39 (1995). 
38 See Roger A. Pielke, Jr. & Daniel Sarewitz, Wanted:  Scientific Leadership on Climate, 
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Winter 2003, at 27-28 (“The situation persists not only because 
the current research-based approach supports those happy with the present political 
gridlock, but more uncomfortably, because the primary beneficiaries of this situation 
include scientists themselves.”). 
